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Abstract Reference pricing is a common cost-sharing
mechanism, with the ﬁnancial penalty for the use of costly
drugs shifted from the third-party payer to the patient.
Unintended distributional consequences might arise, if the
weakest socioeconomic groups face a relatively higher
ﬁnancial burden. This study analyzed for a sample of
Belgian individual prescription data for 4 clusters of
commonly used drugs (proton pump inhibitors, statins and
two groups of antihypertensives [drugs acting on renin-
angiotensin system and dihydropyridine derivatives])
whether the probability to receive the least expensive
molecule within a cluster was linked to the socioeconomic
status of the patient. Logistic regression models included
individual demographic, working, chronic illness and
ﬁnancial status and small area education data for 906,543
prescriptions from 1,280 prescribing general practitioners
and specialists. For the 4 clusters, results show that patients
with lower socioeconomic status consistently use slightly
more the least expensive drugs than other patients. Larger
effects are observed for patients residing in a nursing home
for the elderly, patients entitled to increased reimbursement
of co-payments, unemployed, patients treated in a primary
care center ﬁnanced per capita (and not fee-for-service) and
patients having a chronic illness. Also, patients residing in
neighborhoods with low education status use more less
expensive drugs. The ﬁndings of the study suggest that
although equity considerations were not explicitly taken
into account in the design of the reference price system,
there is no real equity problem, as the costly drugs with
supplement are not prescribed more often in patients from
lower socioeconomic classes.
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Introduction
Reimbursement rules for outpatient drugs differ from
country to country, but all countries face the same chal-
lenges: rises in volume and the emergence of new expensive
treatments. Faced with increasing costs, third-party payers
(TPPs) of the majority of European countries have opted for
reference pricing as a method to curb pharmaceutical
expenditures [1]. The reference price system (RPS) limits
the reimbursement of drugs by establishing a maximum
level of reimbursement (the reference price) for a group of
pharmaceutical products, called a cluster. In addition to any
co-payment(s), the difference between the reference price
and the price of a more costly drug has to be paid by the
patient. This is usually referred to as the reference supple-
ment. It differs from traditional co-payments on two
aspects: First, in general, the supplement can be avoided by
a change in prescription (from a drug with supplement to a
drug without supplement), and second, it applies to all
patients uniformly, no matter their socioeconomic status.
Reference pricing is for that reason an example of selective
(also called targeted or differential) cost sharing, which
intends to provide patients with monetary incentives to alter
their consumption behavior. These cost-sharing measures
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incentive and the initiative are shifted from the provider to
the demand side and thus expose patients to the ﬁnancial
consequence of their drug use. However, it isnot guaranteed
that all patients are fully and equally aware of the existence
and the consequences of the differentiated amount of cost
sharing. Although the general idea behind the cost-sharing
designs is to constrain costs, they may have unintended
distributional consequences if different socioeconomic
groups react differently to the monetary incentives. From a
distributional point of view, it is important to know whether
the weakest groups in society face a relatively higher
ﬁnancial burden or are treated in a different way because the
level of (price) ignorance varies by socioeconomic group.
Policies that encourage individual responsibility should
therefore be monitored closely to avoid undesirable out-
comes in terms of equity. Consequently, differences in use
of drugs without supplement by patients of different
socioeconomic background should be assessed.
This is precisely the question that this study aims to
answer:Whatarethesocioeconomicdriversforthechoiceof
theleastexpensivemolecule(i.e.,thechoicetoprescribeany
drug containing this molecule) within a cluster of therapeu-
tically interchangeable molecules? We studied that question
for four clusters of commonly prescribed drugs in Belgium:
The ﬁrst cluster relates to proton pump inhibitors (PPI),
which are used to treat or prevent gastric reﬂux and ulcers.
The second cluster contains all statins, which are anticho-
lesterol drugs used in primary or secondary prevention of
myocardialinfarction.Thethirdclustercontainstwotypesof
antihypertensives that act on the renin-angiotensin system:
the angiotensin conversion inhibitors (ACE) and the angio-
tensin ii antagonists (sartans). The fourth cluster contains
another type of antihypertensive drugs, known as dihydro-
pyridine derivatives. These deﬁnitions of a cluster are based
on the Anatomical Therapeutical Chemical (ATC) classiﬁ-
cation of drugs from the WHO [2]: A cluster may contain all
drugs belonging to the same pharmacological class (the
ATC-4 class, for instance the cluster containing all statins is
the C10AA) or may even be more broad and includes drugs
having similar therapeutic effects (the ATC-3 class, for
instance all drugs that belong to the C09 class, the agents
acting on the renin-angiotensin system). These are typical
choices in a therapeutic RPS. In Belgium, a generic RPS for
off-patent drugs is in place since 2001 [3, 4], so all drugs
belonging to the same cluster based on the ATC-5 class (the
level of the molecule) have the same reference price. The
choice, in that context, of a generic versus a brand name
product is studied in a companion paper [5].
There are, however, signs toward the acceptance of the
exchangeability of different molecules within a broader
class, which is precisely the hypothesis behind therapeutic
reference pricing. One of those signs is the recent measure
recommending to all Belgian prescribers to initiate 8 out of
10 new treatments with the least expensive mole-
cule(s) within a pharmacological class of drugs. For
instance, for patients starting a statin therapy, physicians
had to initiate treatment with either simvastatin or prava-
statin, the two molecules with the lowest expenditures per
deﬁned daily dose (DDD) for the TPP in 2008.
Before describing the methods and results of our study,
we provide a brief overview of the reimbursement of
pharmaceuticals in Belgium, with an emphasis of measures
aimed at prescribers, and in addition to the details provided
in the companion paper [5].
Reimbursement of pharmaceuticals in Belgium
The amount of the drug expenditures by the TPP is equal to
a certain percentage of the drug reimbursement basis. The
drug reimbursement basis is the public price for original
on-patent drugs and generics and is diminished for original
off-patent drugs with a generic alternative on the Belgian
market. Coinsurance percentages are adapted regularly and
vary from no coinsurance for category A drugs (drugs for
life-threatening conditions) to 80% for category Cx drugs
(reimbursed contraceptives), with the bulk of the reim-
bursements situated in class B (25% coinsurance). Coin-
surance also differs between patients with and without
preferential reimbursement eligibility (basically patients
with a low income).
1
In Belgium, a generic RPS for off-patent drugs was
introduced in June 2001, with major modiﬁcations in July
2005 and in April 2010. The reference price level is
entirely based on a relatively small reduction of the public
price of the brand name drug [6] (16% in 2001, 30% in
2005 and up to 35% in 2010 for drugs in the RPS since
4 years). Therefore, a large number of brand drugs com-
panies, when faced with the entry of generic competitors
on the market, lowered their price to the reference price
level. In that case, patients do not incur any additional
reference supplement for brand name drugs and pay only
the usual coinsurance. Low-cost drugs, deﬁned as those
drugs included in the reference system and not incurring a
reference supplement for the patient, are thus generic drugs
but also brand name original products that lowered their
price to the reference price. However, for patients using
brand name drugs that did not lower their prices, accu-
mulation of the reference supplements might become a
ﬁnancial burden. This, in conjunction with the fact that
1 The drug cost born by patients changed substantially on April 1,
2010. Since the empirical analysis is based on data for 2008, we will
not elaborate on the new regulation and refer to the website of the
TPP for more information (http://www.inami.be/drug/fr/drugs/
general-information/refunding/index.htm#nature).
316 F. Vrijens et al.
123Belgium is one of the few European countries denying
pharmacists the possibility to deliver generic drugs when
brand name drugs are prescribed (the substitution right),
may put the patient in a ﬁnancially difﬁcult situation. Even
if the choice of the brand name product is not (entirely) his,
he alone has to bear the ﬁnancial consequence (the refer-
ence supplement) of this decision.
This is why measures aimed at inﬂuencing prescriber
behavior can substantially impact the ﬁnancial accessibility
of the Belgian health care system. These measures are
described as follows.
Incentives for physicians to prescribe low-cost drugs
Minimum percentages of low-cost drug prescriptions (the
so-called quotas) were introduced in January 2006. In
addition to generic drugs, and to brand name drugs that
lowered their price to the reference price level, drugs
prescribed under the International Nonproprietary Name
(INN) are also considered low cost, whether a generic drug
is available or not. This last category has been included
because, in case of INN prescription, the pharmacist has to
dispense in priority a low-cost drug, if available. Table 1
presents the different quotas by specialty. For instance,
general practitioners (GPs), who prescribe 84% of total
DDD in Belgium [7], have to prescribe 27% of low-cost
drugs. Quotas for other specialties range from 9% for
gynecologists to 30% for gastroenterologists, oncologists,
stomatologists and dentists. The quotas were calculated so
that, in 2004, half of the physicians within a specialty
already reached the quota.
This quota system undoubtedly rapidly increased the
prescription of low-cost drugs: Between 2004 and 2006,
respectively, 1 year before and 1 year after the introduc-
tion of quotas, the prescription of low-cost drugs,
expressed as a percentage of DDD of all reimbursed
drugs, increased from 17.2 to 37.1% [4]. Since then, and
because the quotas were not revised since their intro-
duction, the share of low-cost drugs increased very slowly
to 40.3% of DDD prescribed in 2008 [4]. Interestingly,
already in September 2006, 97% of GPs, 85% of spe-
cialists and 93% of dentists met their quotas of low-cost
prescriptions. In 2008, these percentages were unchanged
for GPs and dentists, while for specialists they reached
90% [8]. Implications of not respecting the quotas include
close monitoring of the physician prescription pattern, and
possibly sanctions, but in practice, this has never been
applied.
Beside these quotas, a new measure was introduced in
2009, which requested physicians to initiate a new treat-
ment with the ‘‘least costly molecule’’ within a cluster of
drugs, and this for 4 groups of medications. This choice
had to be made for at least 8 of 10 patients, if there were no
contraindications and if therapeutic objectives were met.
The ‘‘least costly molecule’’ was identiﬁed based on TPP
expenditure per DDD in 2008. To take into account
changes in costs over time, the list of ‘‘least costly mole-
cules’’ per group is updated on a monthly basis.
The four groups of drugs are listed below, with the
recommended ‘‘least costly molecule’’:
1. PPI: omeprazole and pantoprazole are recommended.
2. ACE inhibitors and sartans: ACE (any of them) are
recommended.
3. Statins: simvastatin and pravastatin are recommended.
4. Nonsteroidal anti-inﬂammatory drugs (NSAIDs): non-
coxibs are recommended.
This study focuses on PPI, statins, ACE and sartans.
NSAIDs were not analyzed because the majority of use is
over-the-counter (OTC) and is not registered in claims
data. We added the class of dihydropyridine derivatives to
our study because they are already part of the therapeutic
RPS in British Columbia and Germany [9, 10], and we
anticipate that Belgian decision-makers could extend the
measure to that group of drugs.
Data
Databases
This study is based on retrospective claims data, available
at the individual level. In Belgium, health insurance is
Table 1 Quotas of low-cost prescriptions per specialty
Specialty Quotas of
low-cost
prescriptions
(%)
a
Gynecology-obstetric \10
Pneumology, rheumatology, pediatric, orthopedic 10–14
Neurosurgery, neurology, ophthalmology, ENT,
neuropsychiatry, physical medicine and
rehabilitation, anesthesiology-reanimation, plastic
surgery, urology
15–19
Dermatology-venereology, psychiatry, surgery,
internal medicine
20–24
General medicine 27
Cardiology, gastroenterology, radiotherapy-oncology,
stomatology, dentistry
28–30
a Low-cost drugs include (1) original drugs that have lowered their
price to the reference price level, (2) generic drugs, (3) drugs pre-
scribed in International Nonproprietary Name
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123compulsory, and detailed data on reimbursed pharmaceu-
ticals are available for all patients.
Our data are based on a linkage of three administrative
databases, at the individual patient level, which was
approved by the Belgian Privacy Commission.
2
The three administrative databases are:
1. A database containing individual data on patient
characteristics of all Belgian sickness funds (Popula-
tion database) and reimbursed pharmaceutical products
delivered by community pharmacists (Pharmanet
database), at the detailed level of the prescription
(claims data).
2. A health care provider database, which contains
information on the year of birth, gender and specialty
of the provider.
3. A database of the socioeconomic characteristics of all
Belgian inhabitants, aggregated at the level of the
statistical sector. Statistical sectors divide municipal-
ities into homogeneous entities in terms of socioeco-
nomic, urban and morphological characteristics.
Approximately 20,000 statistical sectors exist in Bel-
gium. They vary in size and are sometimes not larger
than a street or a neighborhood.
Sampling procedure
A sample of the Pharmanet database was available, detailed
at the prescription level. A two-step sampling procedure
was performed. In a ﬁrst step, a stratiﬁed random sample of
10% of all prescribing GP and 5% of all prescribing spe-
cialists (SP) was selected in Pharmanet, 2008. The stratiﬁ-
cation factor was the specialty such as GP, cardiologist,
gynecologist (complete list in Table 1). To exclude occa-
sional prescribers (physicians without a practice but who
can prescribe for themselves and relatives), prescribers with
less than 200 prescriptions in 2008 were not included in the
sample (100 prescriptions per semester is the lower limit
used by the TPP to include a prescriber in the feedback on
low-cost drugs). For all prescribers selected in step 1, all
patients who received a prescription from that physician
were identiﬁed in a second step. Next, all pharmaceutical
products delivered in 2008 (in ambulatory setting) to those
patients were selected from Pharmanet.
In addition to these data at the individual level, aggre-
gates of the national Pharmanet database were available for
the year 2008 to compute expenditures per DDD.
Only patients being at least 18 years old were included
in this analysis, because all drugs mentioned above are
indicated for adults (and are given exceptionally to children
for very speciﬁc indications), and because some important
socioeconomic characteristics are deﬁned only for adults
(working status is the most important one).
Socioeconomic characteristics
Patient characteristics available for the analysis were as
follows: gender, age, patient is in a rest or nursing home for
the elderly, has a guaranteed income, is entitled to
increased reimbursement of health services, patient work
status (pensioner, invalid and handicapped, unemployed,
employee, self-employed), and patient is entitled to a lump
sum for chronic illness. The geographical location of the
patient residence was also available (Brussels, Wallonia,
Flanders).
We also included two variables that are linked to the
patient but can also characterize physician behavior. These
two variables have in common that they require some
patient loyalty to his/her physician in return for ﬁnancial
advantages in primary care. Patients can opt for having a
global medical record held by a particular GP. In return,
they receive increased reimbursement for their primary
care. Patients can also choose to enroll in a primary care
center (‘‘maison me ´dicale in French, wijkgezondheid-
scentrum in Dutch’’). Contrary to the majority of GPs who
are paid fee-for-service, primary care centers are ﬁnanced
per capita. Patients have free access to the primary care
center where they are enrolled (no co-payment) and in
return lose their right to get reimbursed if they consult
another GP. Being enrolled in a primary care center has no
impact on the reimbursement of drugs (co-payment, ref-
erence supplement) [11].
Physician characteristics included the specialty (GP or
other specialist), gender and age.
Small area information included median taxable income
and the education level. Five income groups were created
(quintiles). The education variable was deﬁned as the share
of individuals having attained post-secondary education,
according to the International Standard classiﬁcation of
Education (ISCED) [12], over the total population aged
18 years or more. The implicit hypothesis behind both
variables is that high-income or highly educated people
have better health literacy [13, 14].
Statistical analyses
First, expenditures in 2008 per DDD were described (TPP
expenditures, patient out-of-pocket expenditures and total
expenditures) for each molecule for the 4 clusters included
in this study: PPI, statins, ACE and sartans, and dihydro-
pyridines derivatives. All molecules available on the
2 The authorization can be accessed at http://www.ksz-bcss.fgov.
be/nl/bcss/page/content/websites/belgium/security/security_06/
security_06_01.html.
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123Belgian market in 2008 for these four classes were inclu-
ded in our analyses. The least costly molecules of each
cluster were then based on the expenditures of the TPP.
These expenditures are not based on our sample, but rep-
resent the national expenditure data from 2008, and were
provided by the Belgian National Institute for Health and
Disability Insurance (the TPP). However, the number of
patients treated by each molecule was calculated based on
our sample described above. Second, logistic regression
models were ﬁtted to assess associations between patients’
and physicians’ characteristics and the probability of a
patient being treated with the ‘‘least costly molecule’’
within a class. The outcome variable was coded as 1 if the
patient received prescriptions for (one of) the ‘‘least costly
molecule(s)’’ within a class, and 0 otherwise. The pre-
scriptions from SPs were given twice the weight of those
from GPs, to account for differences in sampling ratio. The
observation unit was the patient. Patients having received
different molecules from the same cluster were not inclu-
ded in the analysis, because we had no insight into the
reason underlying this switch (non-response, poor com-
pliance and patient preference). Each patient was then
linked to the physician in the sample who prescribed him/
her the largest number of prescriptions. This was done
separately for each cluster of drugs.
All factors described in the data section above were
included in the ﬁnal model, whether statistically signiﬁcant
or not. This choice was made to allow for proper com-
parisons of effects across the four clusters analyzed. Odds
ratios and 95% CI were derived from these regression
models. P values presented are those of the effect of the
factor as a whole (i.e., testing whether there is any differ-
ence between all levels of the factor), and not P values
from pairwise comparisons (testing each level of the factor
to a reference category). It is obvious that comparing
regression results for 4 clusters of drugs prescribed to many
or few patients cannot be solely based on signiﬁcance of
P values, as the associations of the same magnitude will
produce very different P values based only on the size of
the sample [15]. Therefore, to allow meaningful compari-
sons between the 4 clusters, and in addition to results that
are statistically signiﬁcant at 5%, we chose to discuss also
results showing at least a 10% relative difference (OR at
least 1.10, or lower or equal than 0.91), being statistically
signiﬁcant or not. This allows comparison of the magnitude
of effects across the 4 classes, in addition to the precision
of the estimations.
Results
Selection of prescribers and patients
A total of 1,280 prescribers (having prescribed at least 200
prescriptions in 2008) were selected for this study: 822 GPs
(random sample of 10% of all prescribers) and 458 spe-
cialists (stratiﬁed sample of 5% of all prescribers). For
these 1,280 prescribers, all prescriptions (N = 906,543,
94.3% prescribed by GPs) for their adult patients
(N = 203,378, 88.0% treated by GPs) were selected.
Expenditures per DDD and number of patients
under the least costly molecules
Tables 2, 3, 4 and 5 present the expenditures per DDD
(total, TPP, patient out-of-pocket) and the number of
patients in our sample treated by each molecule. The ‘‘least
costly molecules’’ of each cluster, used as outcome variable
in the regression models, are indicated in bold in the tables.
Proton pump inhibitors (PPI)
The average expenditure for one DDD of PPI was €0.84 in
2008: €0.64 for the TPP and €0.20 for the patient. Three out
Table 2 Proton pump inhibitors: expenditures per DDD (2008, national data) and the percentage of patients on each molecule (2008, sample of
data)
ATC5 Name Expenditure per DDD (€) N patients in sample %
TPP Out-of-pocket Total
A02BC01 Omeprazole
a 0.44 0.14 0.58 45,462 67.03
A02BC02 Pantoprazole 1.47 0.41 1.88 11,578 17.07
A02BC03 Lanzoprazole
a 0.52 0.22 0.74 3,282 4.84
A02BC04 Rabeprazole 1.10 0.84 1.94 1,697 2.50
A02BC05 Esomeprazole
a 1.02 0.30 1.32 5,802 8.55
Total 0.64 0.20 0.84 67,821 100.0
a Molecule included in the generic reference price system in 2008. Least costly molecules are indicated in bold
DDD deﬁned daily dose, TPP third-party payer
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ATC5 Name Expenditure per DDD (€) N patients in sample %
TPP Out-of-pocket Total
C10AA01 Simvastatin
a 0.23 0.07 0.29 40,719 49.71
C10AA03 Pravastatin
a 0.40 0.11 0.50 8,221 10.04
C10AA04 Fluvastatin 0.57 0.15 0.72 1,285 1.57
C10AA05 Atorvastatin 1.09 0.19 1.28 19,731 24.09
C10AA07 Rosuvastatin 0.66 0.15 0.81 11,959 14.60
Total 0.56 0.12 0.68 81,915 100.0
a Molecule included in the generic reference price system in 2008. Least costly molecules are indicated in bold
DDD deﬁned daily dose, TPP third-party payer
Table 4 Agents acting on the renin-angiotensin system: expenditures per DDD (2008, national data) and the percentage of patients on each
molecule (2008, sample of data)
ATC5 Name Expenditure per DDD (€) N patients in sample %
TPP Out-of-pocket Total
C09AA01 Captopril
a 0.26 0.09 0.35 1,732 2.14
C09AA02 Enalapril
a 0.10 0.03 0.13 1,477 1.83
C09AA03 Lisinopril
a 0.16 0.04 0.20 13,842 17.10
C09AA04 Perindopril
a 0.40 0.11 0.51 16,160 19.97
C09AA05 Ramipril
a 0.13 0.04 0.16 7,371 9.11
C09AA06 Quinapril
a 0.20 0.06 0.26 1,661 2.05
C09AA07 Benazepril 0.42 0.12 0.54 3 0.00
C09AA08 Cilazapril 0.27 0.08 0.34 244 0.30
C09AA09 Fosinopril 0.55 0.16 0.71 138 0.17
C09BA02 Enalapril and diuretics
a 0.20 0.06 0.26 568 0.70
C09BA03 Lisinopril and diuretics
a 0.34 0.10 0.44 4,367 5.40
C09BA04 Perindopril and diuretics 0.70 0.21 0.90 4,131 5.10
C09BA05 Ramipril and diuretics
a 0.39 0.11 0.50 249 0.31
C09BA05 Ramipril and felodipine 0.42 0.12 0.55 467 0.58
C09BA06 Quinapril and diuretics
a 0.35 0.10 0.45 80 0.10
C09BA08 Cilazapril and diuretics 0.75 0.22 0.97 677 0.84
Subtotal ACE 0.25 0.07 0.32 53,167 65.69
C09CA01 Losartan 0.59 0.09 0.68 3,452 4.27
C09CA02 Eprosartan 0.56 0.13 0.69 1355 1.67
C09CA03 Valsartan 0.43 0.07 0.51 2,690 3.32
C09CA04 Irbesartan 0.48 0.08 0.56 2,995 3.70
C09CA06 Candesartan 0.35 0.07 0.41 2,106 2.60
C09CA07 Telmisartan 0.43 0.07 0.50 1,947 2.41
C09CA08 Olmesartan medoxomil 0.42 0.09 0.52 2,056 2.54
C09DA01 Losartan and diuretics 0.82 0.13 0.95 2,236 2.76
C09DA02 Eprosartan and diuretics 0.58 0.13 0.70 429 0.53
C09DA03 Valsartan and diuretics 0.83 0.14 0.96 2,118 2.62
C09DA04 Irbesartan and diuretics 0.90 0.13 1.03 2,829 3.50
C09DA06 Candesartan and diuretics 0.68 0.13 0.81 1,537 1.90
C09DA07 Telmisartan and diuretics 0.86 0.13 0.99 1,503 1.86
C09DA08 Olmesartan medoxomil and diuretics 0.53 0.13 0.66 511 0.63
Subtotal sartan 0.56 0.10 0.66 27,764 34.31
a Molecule included in the generic reference price system in 2008. Least costly molecules are indicated in bold
DDD deﬁned daily dose, TPP third-party payer
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123of 5 PPI were included in the RPS: omeprazole, lanzop-
razole and esomeprazole. Omeprazole had the lowest
expenditure per DDD (€0.58 per DDD) and was the most
used drug (67% of patients). Lanzoprazole had the second
lowest expenditure per DDD (€0.74 per DDD) and was used
by a small fraction of patients (4.8%). Esomeprazole (€1.32
per DDD) had no generic version available, but was nev-
ertheless included in the RPS due to its nature of isomer of
omeprazole. The two molecules with the highest expendi-
tures were pantoprazole (€1.88 per DDD, 17% of patients)
and rabeprazole (€1.94 per DDD, 8.6% of patients).
Statins
The molecule with the lowest expenditure, simvastatin
(€0.29 per DDD), was used by half of the patients (49.7%).
The molecule with the second lowest expenditure, prava-
statin (€0.50 per DDD), was used by 10% of patients. For
ﬂuvastatin (€0.72 per DDD, 1.6% of patients), rosuvastatin
(€0.81 per DDD, 14.6% of patients) and atorvastatin (€1.28
per DDD, 24% of patients), there was no generic alterna-
tive in 2008, and hence, they were not part of the generic
reference price system.
Agents acting on the renin-angiotensin system
(ACE and sartans)
Agents acting on the renin-angiotensin system include
angiotensin conversion enzyme inhibitors (ACE) and
angiotensin ii antagonists (sartans). The total expenditure
per DDD was €0.32 for ACE (used by 66% of patients) and
€0.67 for sartans (used by 34% of patients). There is,
however, a large variability in expenditure per DDD in the
group of cheap molecules (the ACE), resulting that some
molecules from that group have higher expenditure than
some of the molecules from the expensive group (the sar-
tans). This happens because this cluster combines plain
treatment (ACE or sartan) and plain treatment associated
with diuretics, which are generally more expensive.
Dihydropyridines derivatives
There were 11 molecules on the Belgian market within the
class of dihydropyridines derivatives, three of which had a
low-cost alternative and were included in the reference
price system. Amlodipine, the molecule with the lowest
expenditure per DDD (€ 0.27 per DDD), was also the most
used (67.6% of patients).
Inﬂuence of patients’ and physicians’ socioeconomic
characteristics
Table 6 presents the results of the logistic regressions for
the 4 clusters of drugs. Demographic patient characteristics
do inﬂuence the probability of being prescribed the least
costly molecule within a cluster, but results are contrasted
across the 4 clusters. The strongest effect of age is seen for
the ACE and sartan group, where patients above 45 years
old receive less cheap molecules than younger patients.
This is also true for the class of PPI, where patients above
45 years old consistently receive less omeprazole and
pantoprazole than patients below 45 years old. For the
class of statins and dihydropyridine derivatives, there is a
statistical association with age, but the association is not
Table 5 Dihydropyridines derivatives: expenditures per DDD (2008, national data) and the percentage of patients on each molecule (2008,
sample of data)
ATC5 Name Expenditure per DDD (€) N patients in sample %
TPP Out-of-pocket Total
C08CA01 Amlodipine
a 0.21 0.06 0.27 22,839 61.64
C08CA02 Felodipine
a 0.20 0.09 0.29 1,243 3.35
C08CA03 Isradipine 0.54 0.15 0.70 415 1.12
C08CA04 Nicardipine 0.69 0.19 0.88 88 0.24
C08CA05 Nifedipine
a 0.30 0.12 0.42 3,486 9.41
C08CA07 Nisoldipine 0.86 0.24 1.09 883 2.38
C08CA08 Nitrendipine 0.65 0.18 0.83 52 0.14
C08CA09 Lacidipine 0.55 0.15 0.70 592 1.60
C08CA12 Barnidipine 0.39 0.11 0.51 3,092 8.35
C08CA13 Lercanidipine 0.41 0.12 0.53 4,360 11.77
Total 0.27 0.08 0.35 37,050 100.0
a Molecule included in the generic reference price system in 2008. Least costly molecules are indicated in bold
DDD deﬁned daily dose, TPP third-party payer
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123monotonous. However, for the 4 clusters, a very strong and
consistent association is found with elderly patients in a
rest or nursing home: They are more likely to receive the
least costly molecule within the cluster. Patient gender also
inﬂuences this probability: Male patients receive more of
those drugs for the two antihypertensive classes, but less
for the statins and PPIs.
As far as socioeconomic characteristics are concerned,
all indicators point to the same direction, namely that
patients having a lower socioeconomic status are pre-
scribed more least costly molecules. Patients being entitled
to a guaranteed income and patients eligible for increased
reimbursement of co-payments have a higher probability of
receiving the least costly molecule in the group than
patients without guaranteed income or increased reim-
bursement (all OR are positive), with the largest effects
seen for the PPI class. For the work status, patients not
working (invalids or handicapped and unemployed) con-
sistently use more least costly molecules within a cluster
than employees. The strongest effects are seen for the ACE
and sartans cluster. Self-employed patients also seem to use
more costly molecules than employees, except for PPI.
A very strong and consistent effect was found for those
patients belonging to a primary care center ﬁnanced per
capita; they receive for all 4 clusters more of the least
costly molecules than other patients. Although we deﬁned
this variable as a patient characteristic, very probably, the
effect is the result of speciﬁc patient and physician char-
acteristics. Surprisingly, holding a global medical record is
associated with lower use of cheap molecules for PPI, ACE
and sartan and dihydropyridines.
Patients entitled to a lump sum for chronic illness
receive more least costly molecules than those who are not
entitled. This result is consistent across the 4 clusters.
Physician characteristics also inﬂuence the prescription
of least costly molecules. GPs prescribe more least costly
molecules for PPI and statins. The reverse is true for ACE/
sartans. For dihydropyridine derivatives, there is no asso-
ciation with specialty. Physician gender and age are also
associated with the prescription of a least costly molecule,
but there are no consistent patterns across the 4 clusters:
For the statins and ACE/sartans, older physicians prescribe
less least costly molecules. The reverse is true for PPI.
Analysis of the model robustness revealed collinearity
problems between the two small area characteristics,
income and education. Based on sensitivity analyses, it was
decided to exclude the income variable from the model
(tables including income are available from the authors).
Education has a strong effect for two clusters: Patients
under statin or ACE/sartan living in small areas with low
education levels are more likely to receive cheap molecules,
and this effect is increasing with the level of education. For
the two other drug classes, there are no clear patterns.
Odds ratios from the geographical location of the patient
show that, after adjustment for demographic, socioeco-
nomic and small area information, there are still strong
differences in the use of the least expensive molecules
within clusters, except for the statin group. Patients living
in Flanders have more chance to receive the least expensive
molecule than patients living in Brussels for the PPI cluster
for the ACE ? sartan cluster, but the reverse holds for the
class of dihydropyridines.
Discussion
When examining the RPS from the point of view of
ﬁnancial accessibility of the health care system, a possible
differential impact of the RPS on persons with a different
socioeconomic background should be assessed. This study
shows reassuring results, as no evidence was found that
patients of lower socioeconomic status use more expensive
molecules when cheaper alternatives exist within a cluster
of drugs.
These results are in line with the very scarce studies that
have already been published on that subject. In order to
ﬁnd the relevant empirical evidence, we conducted elec-
tronic searches in the most common databases (see search
algorithm in appendix). Most studies concentrated on
adults aged 65 and older living in British Columbia
(Canada), which has a therapeutic RPS. It is striking that
we could only ﬁnd 3 studies that studied the differentiated
impact of therapeutic RPS on socioeconomic groups. We
brieﬂy describe those 3 studies, which analyze 2 groups of
drugs: ACE and calcium channel blockers.
The ﬁrst two studies, from the same authors, assessed the
impact of the introduction of therapeutic RPS for ACEs [16]
and for calcium channel blockers (CCB) [9] in British
Columbia and explored the association with socioeconomic
status (based on their income). Conclusions of both studies
converge: First, low-income patients have a higher proba-
bility of stopping medications than high-income patients,
but this is true even before introduction of the RPS. Second,
compared to high-income patients, those on low and middle
income were more likely to switch from the expensive drug
(having a reference supplement) to a drug without supple-
ment or to switch to another antihypertensive therapy. A
third study [17] focused on the effect of physician gender on
changes in prescribing patterns of ACE, also in British
Columbia. The authors found that patients of female phy-
sicians were more likely to remain on cost-sharing ACE
inhibitors with an exemption. The authors argued that this
difference might be related to the fact that female physi-
cians are more responsive to their patients’ requests.
Our results are in line with those few studies from
British Columbia: Economically frail patients seem to use
Patient socioeconomic determinants 323
123the least expensive molecules within a cluster and bear a
lower ﬁnancial burden for their medications than patients
of higher socioeconomic status. Nevertheless, as our ﬁnd-
ings are based on observational data, they have to be read
cautiously in view of some limitations. First, we based our
analysis on consumers only (patients who were prescribed
reimbursed medications), and not on the total Belgian
population. The implicit unproven hypothesis behind this
choice is that all patients needing treatment have access to
it. A second limitation is that the availability of socioeco-
nomic variables in the sickness funds database is rather
limited; especially, the lack of information on education at
the individual level is a drawback. This constraint was
partially offset by the use of the education level available
for the place of residence of the patient. Other limitations
were about the design of the study itself. We had only
access to a proportionally smaller sample for specialist
prescriptions (sample of 5%) compared to GPs (sample of
10%). This implies that our results for the specialists are
less reliable than our results for the GPs. Also, we could
only link each patient to the most prescribing physician
within our sample of physicians, and not in absolute terms.
We are thus not sure to have captured the most important
patient–physician relationship for all patients.
One strength of the study is the linkage of three dat-
abases (one for patient characteristics, one for physician
characteristics and one for small area characteristics)
combined with a large sample size (more than 900,000
prescriptions in 2008), which makes the data particularly
suited for the speciﬁc research question in this paper.
There is, to date, no therapeutic RPS in Belgium. The
assessment in the study of possible unintended distribu-
tional consequences of that kind of system identiﬁed no
systematic differences in the use of the least costly mol-
ecules against less privileged socioeconomic groups. This
is a reassuring message for health decision-makers who
intend to enlarge the current selection of groups to other
pharmacological classes and other types of users
(removing the current restriction to the new users target
population). This result may be due to the fact that poor
patients react to monetary signals and interact with phy-
sicians who are well informed on this matter. It may also
be the case that physicians take their quotas seriously and
have actively selected low-cost medicines, especially for
their deprived patients. Indeed, Belgium’s health care
system has historically aimed to guarantee access to
health services for vulnerable population groups. A good
example of a measure in line with this objective is the
early establishment of the TPP system that allows a direct
payment to the pharmacist of the reimbursable part of any
delivered drug. In conclusion, introducing a selective
cost-sharing measure should be accompanied by measures
guaranteeing equal access to information on prices and
therapies, as a necessary step to avoid inequities among
patients.
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Appendix: Algorithm for the electronic search
of relevant articles
In order to ﬁnd the relevant empirical evidence, we con-
ducted electronic searches in Medline, Embase, Econlit and
in the Cochrane Library database for studies published
between 1988 and 2009.
The search was based on a set of key words (MeSH
terms and/or text words): reference pricing OR reference
price OR reference prices OR reference based pricing OR
reference adj2 pric$.
We deﬁned a priori eligibility criteria (the study had to
be based on empirical analysis and had to examine the
effects of a reference price system on drug use and/or
health outcomes and/or costs), which led to the selection of
35 relevant articles.
Of those, only three studies discussed the effect of
patient socioeconomic characteristics. The results of those
three studies are described in the main text.
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